Glossary

The judicial-review provision of FASCSA. Grants the D.C. Circuit exclusive jurisdiction over petitions challenging "covered procurement actions" taken under 41 U.S.C. § 4713. Whether Anthropic's challenge falls within § 1327's reach is one of the three issues the D.C. Circuit panel pre-ordered for argument.

The Department of Defense's supply-chain risk authority, codified at 10 U.S.C. § 3252 (originally enacted in NDAA 2011 § 806). It allows the Secretary to designate a source as a "supply chain risk" — defined as the risk that "an adversary may sabotage, maliciously introduce unwanted function, or otherwise subvert" a national security system. Legislative history and DoD implementing instructions show the statute was aimed at foreign intelligence services, terrorists, and hostile actors, not domestic vendors. Unlike [FASCSA](#fascsa), § 3252 has no built-in notice, response, or judicial-review procedure.

The APA provision authorizing a reviewing court (or, in some cases, the agency itself) to "postpone the effective date of an agency action" to "prevent irreparable injury" pending judicial review. Anthropic sought a § 705 stay alongside its TRO/PI motion; Judge Lin granted it as to the Hegseth Directive and the Supply Chain Designation.

Latin for "friend of the court." A non-party that files a brief with the court's permission to provide perspective or expertise. This case has drawn unusually heavy amicus participation: Microsoft, FIRE, EFF, ACLU, the Cato Institute, 149 former judges, former senior national- security officials, and others have filed in support of Anthropic; one amicus (Joel Thayer, America First Policy Institute) filed in support of the government.

The Administrative Procedure Act, codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–706. The framework statute for federal-court review of agency action. The two operative provisions in this case are § 706(2)(A) (set aside action that is "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law"), § 706(2)(C) (action "in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations"), and § 706(2)(D) (action "without observance of procedure required by law"). Anthropic invokes all three on Counts I and II.

The APA's most-used standard for setting aside agency action (5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)). Under *Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm*, 463 U.S. 29 (1983), action is arbitrary and capricious if the agency relied on factors Congress did not intend it to consider, failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation that runs counter to the evidence, or gave an explanation so implausible it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or to agency expertise.

A legislative or executive act that singles out an identifiable person and imposes punishment without judicial process. Prohibited by U.S. Const. art. I, §§ 9 cl. 3 (federal) and 10 cl. 1 (states). The modern test (*Selective Service System v. Minnesota PIRG*, 468 U.S. 841 (1984); *Nixon v. Administrator*, 433 U.S. 425 (1977)) requires specificity and punishment. Raised by Koh and co-authors on Just Security but not pleaded in Anthropic's complaint.

The Pentagon's Chief Digital and AI Office, which signed a $200 million contract with Anthropic in July 2025 — one of the markers that DoW had vetted and cleared Anthropic to operate under the Usage Policy restrictions long before treating those restrictions as a national security threat.

Judge Lin's umbrella term for the three legally distinct government measures Anthropic challenges in N.D. Cal.: the Presidential Directive, the Hegseth Directive, and the Supply Chain Designation. The PI enjoins all three.

The term used in 41 U.S.C. § 4713 for the kinds of agency decisions that can result in a FASCSA exclusion — for example, an exclusion order, a notice removing a source from a covered procurement, or a no-rebid determination. The D.C. Circuit can review only "covered procurement actions"; whether the March 3 FASCSA letter to Anthropic constitutes or directs such an action is one of the three issues the panel pre-ordered for argument.

The U.S. Department of War, formerly the Department of Defense, renamed by Executive Order 14347 on September 5, 2025 (90 Fed. Reg. 43893). The principal defendant in N.D. Cal. and the respondent in both appellate proceedings.

The Defense Production Act of 1950, 50 U.S.C. §§ 4501 et seq. Title I authorizes the President to compel production of items essential to national defense. Hegseth threatened to invoke the DPA against Anthropic in the February 24 meeting — which would have required treating Claude as *essential* to national security, the opposite framing from the "supply chain risk" theory adopted three days later.

The Executive Office of the President — the cluster of agencies that directly support the President. Named as a defendant in N.D. Cal. as to the Presidential Directive but not enjoined on PI for lack of record evidence of implementing action; remains bound by Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d).

The Federal Acquisition Regulation, the body of regulations governing federal contracting (48 C.F.R. ch. 1). FAR 9.402(b) limits the use of debarment and suspension to actions "imposed only in the public interest for the Government's protection and not for purposes of punishment" — the basis for Lawfare's argument that the Supply Chain Designation exceeds the agency's procurement authority.

The Federal Acquisition Supply Chain Security Act, codified at 41 U.S.C. § 4713. It authorizes federal agencies to bar (or "exclude") contractors from federal procurement when they pose a supply-chain risk to national security. Compared with the parallel DoD authority at 10 U.S.C. § 3252, FASCSA is procedurally more protective: it requires 30 days' notice, an opportunity to respond, interagency review by the Federal Acquisition Security Council, and direct judicial review in the D.C. Circuit under [§ 1327](#section-1327).

A petition for direct review filed in the D.C. Circuit under 41 U.S.C. § 1327 challenging a FASCSA exclusion or covered procurement action. It bypasses the district court — the statute channels review straight to the D.C. Circuit. In this case, Anthropic's D.C. Circuit petition (No. 26-1049) is a FASCSA petition challenging the March 3 FASCSA designation letter, even as the parallel § 3252 designation is being litigated in N.D. Cal.

Facility Security Clearance. The Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency (DCSA) clearance that allows a contractor to access classified information at a given level. Anthropic holds a Top Secret FCL — a fact the record uses to undermine the supply-chain-risk framing (DoW cleared Anthropic at the highest level before deciding the company was a national-security threat).

Federal Risk and Authorization Management Program — the government-wide program that authorizes cloud products and services for federal use. Anthropic holds FedRAMP High authorization (the most stringent civilian tier) and DoD Impact Level (IL) 4-5 authorization for DoD workloads. As with the FCL, these authorizations cut against the supply-chain-risk theory.

A First Amendment claim that government action was taken in retaliation for protected speech. Under the Ninth Circuit's *Arizona Students' Ass'n v. Arizona Bd. of Regents*, 824 F.3d 858 (9th Cir. 2016), test: (1) plaintiff engaged in protected activity; (2) the action would chill a person of ordinary firmness; (3) the protected activity was a substantial motivating factor. Under *Hartman v. Moore*, 547 U.S. 250 (2006), the burden then shifts to the defendant to show it would have taken the action regardless.

Under *Hartman v. Moore*, 547 U.S. 250 (2006), once the plaintiff makes a prima facie showing of retaliation, the burden shifts to the defendant to show it would have taken the action absent the protected speech. Defendants here pointed to the contracting impasse, but Anthropic's Usage Policy had been in place for over a year and had never been treated as risky before Anthropic went public.

As used on this site and in Judge Lin's opinion: Secretary of War Pete Hegseth's X post of February 27, 2026 (about an hour after the Presidential Directive) doing two things: (a) directing DoW to designate Anthropic a "Supply-Chain Risk to National Security"; and (b) declaring that "Effective immediately, no contractor, supplier, or partner that does business with the United States military may conduct any commercial activity with Anthropic." The second piece — the contractor blacklist — was conceded ultra vires by government counsel at argument.

An appeal taken from a court order entered before final judgment — permitted only for specified kinds of orders, including the grant of a preliminary injunction. The government's Ninth Circuit appeal (No. 26-2011) is an interlocutory appeal of Judge Lin's PI; the Ninth Circuit has stayed it pending the D.C. Circuit's resolution of the parallel FASCSA petition.

The Supreme Court's recent administrative-law doctrine requiring "clear congressional authorization" before an agency can decide a question of "vast economic and political significance." Lawfare commentary argues that under the IEEPA tariffs decision earlier in 2026, the doctrine extends to supply-chain risk designations — which lack any historical precedent for use against domestic AI vendors.

The procedural-due-process test from *Mathews v. Eldridge*, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). Courts balance (1) the private interest affected; (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation through the procedures used and the value of additional safeguards; (3) the government's interest and the burdens of additional procedures. Judge Lin applied it to find a procedural-due- process violation in the absence of pre-deprivation notice.

A motion seeking final judgment on the existing record, without trial, on the ground that there is "no genuine dispute as to any material fact." "Cross-MSJ" is when both sides move simultaneously — common in APA cases where review is on the administrative record. The N.D. Cal. cross-MSJ hearing is set for July 30, 2026.

From *National Rifle Association of America v. Vullo*, 602 U.S. 175 (2024). When the government uses its leverage over a contracting partner to punish or suppress disfavored speech by a third party, it can violate the First Amendment even without a direct regulatory action. Most relevant in this case to the contracting/procurement context — whether the doctrine reshapes First Amendment retaliation analysis when the government acts as procurer.

Latin for "by the court." An opinion or order issued in the name of the panel as a whole rather than authored by any single judge. The D.C. Circuit's emergency-stay denial and supplemental-briefing order were both per curiam.

The framework from *Pickering v. Board of Education*, 391 U.S. 563 (1968), for First Amendment claims arising in the government-as-employer or government-as-contractor context. Balances the speaker's interest in speaking against the government's interest as employer/contractor. The Ninth Circuit's *Arizona Students' Ass'n* test (which Judge Lin applied) is functionally similar; Lin noted in a footnote that the result here would be the same under *Pickering*.

A court order entered early in a lawsuit that preserves the status quo while the merits are litigated. The standard requires likelihood of success on the merits, irreparable harm, a favorable balance of equities, and that the order be in the public interest. Judge Lin's PI in this case enjoins the three Challenged Actions while the cross-MSJ briefing runs.

As used on this site and in Judge Lin's opinion: President Trump's Truth Social post of February 27, 2026 at 3:47 p.m. ET directing every federal agency to "IMMEDIATELY CEASE all use of Anthropic's technology." One of the three Challenged Actions enjoined by the PI. Cites no statutory authority and is the subject of Anthropic's Count V ultra vires challenge.

Under *Department of Commerce v. New York*, 588 U.S. 752 (2019), even where an agency has statutory authority, courts must reject agency action whose stated rationale is a "contrived" pretext for the actual motive. Courts are "not required to exhibit a naiveté from which ordinary citizens are free." Judge Lin applied this to the Supply Chain Designation, finding the timing, the inconsistencies (Michael's cordial emails; Hegseth's DPA threat), and the post-hoc nature of the record showed the rationale was pretextual.

Latin for "for this occasion." A motion seeking court permission for an attorney who is not admitted in that jurisdiction to appear in a particular case. Most of WilmerHale's Anthropic team appears pro hac vice in N.D. Cal.; the docket sheet shows ~10 pro hac vice motions filed and granted in the first weeks.

The D.C. Circuit's test for when government action that damages a company's reputation rises to a deprivation of a protected liberty interest. Under *Trifax Corp. v. District of Columbia* and *Old Dominion Dairy Prods. v. Sec'y of Defense*, a "broad preclusion" that "seriously affect[s], if not destroy[s]" a company's ability to obtain contracts is enough — a complete prohibition is not required. Judge Lin held the three Challenged Actions satisfy this test.

As used on this site and in Judge Lin's opinion: Secretary Hegseth's March 3, 2026 formal determination under 10 U.S.C. § 3252 designating Anthropic a supply-chain risk, communicated to Anthropic by letter received March 4. The third of the three Challenged Actions. A separate March 3 letter invoked FASCSA — that letter is the subject of the parallel D.C. Circuit case.

Latin for "beyond the powers." An equitable cause of action available against an executive official who acts beyond the bounds of statutory or constitutional authority. Distinct from APA review and not subject to APA preclusion provisions. Anthropic's Count V is an ultra vires challenge to the Presidential Directive; Judge Lin held the Hegseth Directive's contractor-blacklist language ultra vires (on the government's own concession at argument).

Under *Webster v. Doe*, 486 U.S. 592 (1988), broad statutory preclusion-of-review provisions are read NOT to preclude constitutional claims unless Congress clearly intends to do so. Acts as a backstop: even where a statute like § 3252 may bar APA review, constitutional claims (First Amendment, due process) survive.