The case, in full
Anthropic PBC v. U.S. Department of War is a single dispute being litigated in three federal courts at once. The merits action is in the Northern District of California, where Judge Rita F. Lin granted a preliminary injunction on March 26, 2026. A parallel petition challenging a different statutory hook is pending in the D.C. Circuit, which heard oral argument on May 19 and ordered supplemental briefing through June 4. The government's interlocutory appeal of the trial-court PI sits stayed in the Ninth Circuit until the D.C. Circuit resolves the parallel case.
The timeline tracks events chronologically; the issues page treats each doctrinal question individually; the per-docket pages catalog every filing. Where this page summarizes, those pages drill in.
Background
Anthropic's Usage Policy for Claude has, since 2023, forbidden two specific deployments regardless of customer: mass surveillance of Americans and lethal autonomous warfare. The company has been explicit that the restriction is not ideological — its position is that Claude is not currently safe for those use cases, and that releasing it for them would do harm.
The Department of War — renamed from the Department of Defense by Executive Order 14347 on September 5, 2025 — knew about these restrictions and accepted them for over a year. "Claude Gov" entered DoD use in March 2025 under the existing Usage Policy. By mid-2025, Anthropic held a Top Secret facility clearance, FedRAMP High and DoD IL 4-5 authorizations, a $200 million Chief Digital and AI Office contract, and a government-wide GSA acquisition vehicle. The restrictions that DoW would later call a national-security threat had been on the table the entire time.
In late 2025, DoW began pressing Anthropic to strip the carve-outs and accept "any lawful use" language across all DoW contracts. Anthropic refused. The disagreement moved into the open with Dario Amodei's January 2026 essay and Anthropic's February 26 public statement. Two days after Anthropic's statement, the dispute moved out of contract negotiation and into something else entirely.
The three Challenged Actions
Judge Lin's preliminary-injunction opinion uses Challenged Actions as an umbrella term for the three legally distinct government measures Anthropic challenges in N.D. Cal.
The Presidential Directive arrived first. At 3:47 p.m. ET on February 27, 2026, President Trump posted on Truth Social directing "EVERY Federal Agency in the United States Government to IMMEDIATELY CEASE all use of Anthropic's technology." The post cited no statutory authority.
The Hegseth Directive followed an hour later. Secretary of War Pete Hegseth posted on X both (a) directing the Department of War to designate Anthropic a "Supply-Chain Risk to National Security" and (b) declaring that "Effective immediately, no contractor, supplier, or partner that does business with the United States military may conduct any commercial activity with Anthropic." The post characterized this contractor blacklist as "final." At oral argument three weeks later, the government conceded it was aware of no statute authorizing the blacklist and that the language had "absolutely no legal effect at all."
The Supply Chain Designation followed on March 3. Secretary Hegseth issued a formal determination under 10 U.S.C. § 3252 designating Anthropic a supply-chain risk, communicated to Anthropic by letter dated March 3 and received March 4. A separate March 3 letter to Anthropic invoked FASCSA — the Federal Acquisition Supply Chain Security Act (41 U.S.C. § 4713), a procurement statute whose judicial-review provision channels challenges directly to the D.C. Circuit — routing the same designation through a different statutory framework. The § 3252 letter is at the heart of the N.D. Cal. case; the FASCSA letter is the subject of the parallel D.C. Circuit petition.
The substantive content of the three actions overlaps, but they operate under different sources of law, follow different procedures, and are reviewable in different forums. That structural fact is why this dispute spans three dockets.
The complaint
Anthropic filed simultaneously in the Northern District of California and the D.C. Circuit on March 9, 2026. The N.D. Cal. complaint pleads five counts. Count I is an APA challenge to the § 3252 designation as in excess of statutory authority, contrary to law, and arbitrary and capricious. Count II is an APA challenge to the Hegseth Directive's contractor blacklist as in excess of authority. Count III is a procedural due-process claim under the Fifth Amendment. Count IV is a First Amendment retaliation claim, with viewpoint discrimination pleaded as an alternative theory. Count V is an ultra vires challenge — i.e., that the official acted beyond the bounds of any statutory or constitutional authority — to the Presidential Directive.
The complaint names eighteen federal agencies and their leadership — every agency that had received the Trump Truth Social post as a directive, plus Secretary Hegseth in his official capacity and the Executive Office of the President. WilmerHale is lead counsel for Anthropic: Michael J. Mongan leads in the Northern District of California; Kelly P. Dunbar leads the D.C. Circuit appellate work.
The PI ruling
On March 26, 2026, Judge Lin issued a 43-page opinion granting Anthropic's motion for a preliminary injunction. The order restores the status quo as of February 27 by enjoining all three Challenged Actions; it does not require any agency to use Claude. The Court imposed a $100 nominal bond and a seven-day administrative stay that expired on April 2.
Lin found likelihood of success on three independent theories.
The First Amendment retaliation analysis followed the Ninth Circuit's three-prong test from Arizona Students' Ass'n v. Arizona Bd. of Regents (2016). Anthropic's January 2026 essay and February 26 statement were speech on matters of public concern — "at the heart of the First Amendment's protection," in the Snyder v. Phelps formulation. The government did not dispute that the Challenged Actions would chill speech of ordinary firmness; on the nexus prong, Lin pointed to the government's own contemporaneous statements. Hegseth's X post characterized Anthropic's position as "arrogance," "sanctimonious rhetoric," "corporate virtue-signaling," "defective altruism," and "Silicon Valley ideology." Trump's Truth Social posts called Anthropic a "RADICAL LEFT, WOKE COMPANY" of "Leftwing nut jobs" who had "made a DISASTROUS MISTAKE trying to STRONG-ARM the Department of War." The Michael Memo supporting the § 3252 designation expressly relied on Anthropic's "increasingly hostile manner through the press."
Under Hartman v. Moore, the burden then shifted to the government to show it would have taken the same action absent the protected speech. The government pointed to the contracting impasse, but the impasse had been in place for over a year and the same restrictions had never before been treated as risky. Lin distinguished AFGE v. Trump (9th Cir. 2026), where the retaliatory statements were extraneous to an otherwise legitimately grounded executive order; here, the retaliatory framing was on the face of the action.
The procedural due process analysis applied Mathews v. Eldridge's three-factor balancing. The Court held that the Challenged Actions implicate a protected liberty interest in federal-contracting eligibility and reputation under the D.C. Circuit's "reputation plus" test, citing Trifax Corp. v. District of Columbia and Old Dominion Dairy Prods. v. Secretary of Defense. A complete prohibition on practicing one's calling is not required; a "broad preclusion" that "seriously affect[s], if not destroy[s]" the company's ability to obtain contracts suffices. The government conceded no pre-deprivation notice was given and argued exigency, but the Court found the record contradicted any exigency claim — the parties had been operating under the disputed terms for over a year; the government's own six-month transition plan signaled no urgency; U.S. forces were actively using Claude in Iran operations within days of the ban; and Hegseth had threatened the Defense Production Act days earlier, which would have treated Anthropic as essential to national security. The two framings could not be reconciled.
The APA analysis identified three independent problems with the § 3252 designation. First, the designation falls outside the statute's text. Section 3252 targets the risk that an "adversary may sabotage, maliciously introduce unwanted function, or otherwise subvert" a covered system. The text describes covert acts; it does not reach a vendor's open negotiating posture, and the government could identify no record evidence that Anthropic had any technical capability to alter or stop Claude in DoW environments after deployment. Lin held that reading "supply chain risk" so broadly would "make Section 3252's restrictions on the Secretary's discretion meaningless." Second, the procedure was defective: Hegseth's six identical letters to congressional committees did not discuss less intrusive measures — required by § 3252(b)(3)(B) — and the risk assessment came from Emil Michael, the Under Secretary for Research and Engineering and Anthropic's own contract negotiator, when 48 C.F.R. § 239.7304(a) requires it from the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence. Third, the record was pretextual under Department of Commerce v. New York: Michael's same-day cordial emails to Amodei ("I think we are very close here") could not be reconciled with his contemporaneous characterization of Anthropic as an "unacceptable national security threat," and the DPA threat days earlier could not be squared with the "supply chain risk" framing.
The Court also held the Hegseth Directive ultra vires on the basis of the government's concession at argument. It did not reach Anthropic's separate ultra vires challenge to the Presidential Directive — three independent merits problems were already enough.
The D.C. Circuit case
The D.C. Circuit petition (No. 26-1049) is a FASCSA petition — a narrower, statute-specific proceeding under FASCSA's direct-review mechanism, 41 U.S.C. § 1327, which sends review straight to the D.C. Circuit and bypasses the district court entirely. FASCSA differs from § 3252 in ways that matter: it provides 30 days' notice, an opportunity to respond, interagency review, and direct judicial review in the D.C. Circuit. Section 3252 has none of those features. DoW issued both letters the same day; Anthropic challenged each in its statutorily appropriate forum.
Anthropic moved for an emergency stay of the FASCSA designation in March. The D.C. Circuit denied it per curiam in April, before a panel of Wilkins, Katsas, and Rao. Commentary read the denial as procedurally driven rather than a merits signal. Before oral argument, the panel — now Henderson, Katsas, and Rao — pre-ordered briefing on three specific issues: whether the court has jurisdiction under § 1327 over a "covered procurement action" — the statute's term for the agency decisions reviewable under § 4713 — taken under that section; whether the determination or notice "directs or takes" such an action; and whether Anthropic has any capability to affect Claude's functioning before or after delivery to the Department.
The third question echoes the factual issue Judge Lin answered against the government in the N.D. Cal. case. Oral argument was held on May 19, 2026. Two days later, the panel ordered supplemental briefs (not to exceed 2,500 words). The briefs were originally due May 28; on joint motion the deadline was extended to June 4. The order is consistent with the panel actively working through one or more of the briefed issues.
The stayed Ninth Circuit appeal
The government noticed an interlocutory appeal — an early-stage appeal of a specified order before final judgment — of Judge Lin's PI to the Ninth Circuit on April 2, 2026 (No. 26-2011). On April 22 the government moved to stay the appellate proceedings; Anthropic did not oppose; the stay was granted on April 27. The appeal is currently dormant. The order requires the government to move for relief within 21 days after the D.C. Circuit's resolution of No. 26-1049 — so the next move in the Ninth Circuit is tied to the timing of the D.C. Circuit's decision.
The commentary landscape
The dominant view in the legal-academic and practitioner commentary is that the government's substantive position is weak, but that the procedural posture across two circuits creates real complexity. Alan Z. Rozenshtein and Michael Endrias' Lawfare piece — "Pentagon's Anthropic Designation Won't Survive First Contact with Legal System" — set the analytical frame, walking through statutory text, the Webster v. Doe carveout for constitutional claims, Department of Commerce v. New York pretext, and the FAR's prohibition on debarment for punishment, then anchoring the analysis in Luokung Technology Corp. v. DoD and Xiaomi Corp. v. DoD. Harold Hongju Koh and co-authors on Just Security raised a Bill of Attainder theory not in Anthropic's complaint; the modern attainder test arguably reaches the designation because it singles Anthropic out by name and imposes punishment without judicial process. Koh subsequently appeared as pro hac counsel for the Former Senior National Security Government Officials amicus group.
Commentary from AEI defends the government's procedural posture but agrees that the social-media origin of the Challenged Actions creates substantial First Amendment exposure. Jones Walker's "Two Courts, Two Postures" piece explains for practitioners why the D.C. Circuit's stay denial does not undermine Judge Lin's PI. Wiley Rein has covered the FASCSA mechanics for the procurement bar. News coverage — Breaking Defense, CNBC, CNN, CBS, NPR, the Hill — has tracked each major move; Pentagon CTO Emil Michael publicly asserted post-PI that the designation remains "in full force and effect." Full coverage on the /coverage page.
The amici lean overwhelmingly toward Anthropic. Microsoft is on the brief in both cases. Employees of OpenAI and Google joined in their personal capacities. Former service secretaries, retired senior military officers, and former senior national security officials filed in support. FIRE, EFF, Cato, Chamber of Progress, FALA, ACLU, CDT, 149 former judges with Democracy Defenders Fund, Catholic theologians and ethicists, TechNet, SIIA, CCIA, ITI, ACT|The App Association, and the Freedom Economy Business Association coalition all filed in support of petitioner. Only one amicus brief was filed in support of the government — Joel Thayer of the America First Policy Institute, in the D.C. Circuit alone.
What to watch
The next sixty days will be the most consequential of the case so far. The D.C. Circuit decision in No. 26-1049 is the load-bearing event. A ruling for Anthropic on the merits would effectively confirm Judge Lin's holding and make Ninth Circuit affirmance of the PI more likely. A ruling for the government on jurisdiction — that § 1327 does not reach the form of action taken here — would push the dispute back into N.D. Cal. exclusively, where § 3252 still falls under Anthropic's existing PI. A ruling for the government on the merits would create a circuit-level conflict with the N.D. Cal. PI rationale, and would likely move the dispute toward Supreme Court review.
In parallel, the N.D. Cal. record will be substantially built out over the next eight weeks. The certified administrative record was due to roll out through May 22, with a DHS extension to May 29. The government's Answer is due June 8; Anthropic's MSJ on June 10; cross-briefing runs through July 15; the hearing is set for July 30. The doctrinal questions that the PI did not resolve — Tucker Act jurisdiction, the ultra vires challenge to the Presidential Directive, the alternative viewpoint-discrimination theory, the scope of any permanent injunction — will be argued there.
The doctrinal questions in play extend beyond this case. The reach of Webster v. Doe. The application of Department of Commerce v. New York to social-media-driven agency decisions. Whether a § 3252-style stripped-down procedure can satisfy Mathews when applied to a domestic, non-adversary contractor. Whether the major-questions doctrine — fresh from the Supreme Court's IEEPA tariffs decision earlier in 2026 — extends to supply-chain designations. Whether the Bill of Attainder doctrine, rarely applied to corporate entities, can be revived as a backstop. Whether the NRA v. Vullo framework reshapes First Amendment retaliation analysis when the government acts as procurer rather than regulator. These are the questions that will outlast the immediate dispute.
A subtler thing to watch is what OpenAI does. OpenAI's classified deployment contract with the Pentagon, announced the day after Anthropic's designation, includes substantively similar restrictions: no mass domestic surveillance, no autonomous weapons, no high-stakes automated decisions. If those red lines are genuinely comparable, the disparate treatment is itself a pretext signal — and a strong one. How the government handles OpenAI's restrictions over the next several months will say more about the durability of the "supply chain risk" theory than most of the litigation itself.